The diagram

How it happened

One point on one bend, drawn to scale from the recorded measurements — the wall that should have stood at 1.25 metres, the 0.23-metre remnant where the capping was removed, and the drop beyond it.

The stretch of bridge wall where the capping was removed, photographed by the family — The stretch of wall where the capping was removed, as the family photographed it. Family photograph, February 2026.

Annotated aerial photograph of the bridge — The bridge from the air — the rebuilt arch wall at ~1.25 m, the lowered stretch where the capping was removed, and the ~4.3 m drop to the River Aherlow. Press video frame, used with permission; annotations from the council's inspection record (21 Jan 2025) and the forensic survey.

Annotated overhead photograph of the bridge deck — The deck from above — the low wall and the rebuilt 1.25 m parapet side by side, the water directly beyond. Press video frame, used with permission; annotations as above.

Annotated photograph at the breach in the wall — Human scale at the entry point — the wall at about 0.23 m, and where she entered the water. Press video frame, used with permission; annotations as above.

Annotated road-level photograph of the blind bend — The blind 90° bend, with no warning sign on the approach. Press video frame, used with permission; annotations as above.

What each figure is

1.25 m — the height the parapet should have stood.
0.23 m — at the point of impact: capping “partly removed”, a 5 m length collapsed. TCC engineering inspection, 21 Jan 2025.
~4.3 m — the drop to the River Aherlow. DWA forensic survey, May 2025.
60 km/h — posted limit, cut from 80 km/h on 7 February 2025 — eleven weeks before. TCC PMS record.
Within the limit; did not swerve. Garda review.

Illustrative, drawn to the recorded measurements; states no fault or causation.

The council’s own rulebook has a procedure for exactly this — and it was not followed. The council inspects under the Department of Transport’s Bridge Asset Management System for Regional and Local Roads (2019). That manual rates a parapet “part or all… missing, collapsed or significantly displaced” as RED — “significant damage that represents a safety hazard.” Its “Dangerous Bridges” procedure then states, in its own words, that where a bridge is “an immediate risk to public safety,” it is “essential that each Local Authority has a procedure in place,” under which the inspector reports to the Municipal District (MD) Engineer, whose response is to “check the structure in person… and determine if any immediate temporary measures to make the road safe, such as signing and guarding, are required.”

The council’s own engineer recorded this parapet on 21 January 2025 as “a 5m long length of wall has collapsed” and the capping “partly removed,” with “Is Signage Present? No.” The family’s position is that a five-metre collapsed, unsigned parapet on an open road is plainly the “immediate risk to public safety” this procedure exists for — and that the response the manual sets out, signing and guarding by the MD Engineer, was not carried out in the ninety-three days before Bronagh died. The council’s own rules and record →

Verbatim from: DoT Bridge Asset Management System for Regional and Local Roads (2019) — Maintenance Inspection parapet RED criterion (Table 4.2) and the “Dangerous Bridges” procedure; the condition scale (CR3 “repair soon”, CR4 “repair immediately”, CR5 “road closure or TMP”); roadguidelines.ie. Engineering inspection of Killardry Bridge (TY-L3151-B-010), 21 January 2025 (quoted words verbatim). Whether this bridge was an “immediate risk to public safety,” and any question of liability, are matters for the proper legal process.

Last updated 2026-09-07. This is a living record — findings are added as dated entries and prior versions remain visible.